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Abstract
Background: The Medicare Bundled Payments for Care Improvement (BPCI) pilot program aims to reward high-value providers
by setting a global payment target for particular episodes of care. The representativeness of BPCI participants will influence the
ability of this pilot to inform policy decisions.
Methods: We linked the Medicare lists of participants in the risk-bearing portion of BPCI Model 2, encompassing acute and
post-acute care, to the American Hospital Association resource file and the 2013 Hospital Value-Based Purchasing quality
performance data. We classified episode-initiating hospitals by the number of bundles in which they were participating into
“narrow”, “medium” and “comprehensive”. The analysis described the characteristics of hospitals in each of these categories.
Results: The 105 hospitals with linkable data were predominantly large, urban, non-profit, teaching hospitals. These hospitals
were quite similar to the general population in terms of disproportionate share, Medicare, and Medicaid percentages. Most
participants selected a narrow number of bundles, with the majority selecting a single bundle around joint replacement. There
were only minor differences in quality between Model 2 participants and non-participants.
Conclusions: Informing the decision about whether to scale the BPCI program nationally will require evaluation of the pilot’s performance by participants’ characteristics to understand in what conditions and for which providers the program is most
effective.
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Introduction

The Affordable Care Act (ACA) provided the legislative
framework enabling Medicare to initiate bundled payments
under the Bundled payments for Care Improvement (BPCI)
initiative. Bundled payments provide a single payment for
an episode of care that may span multiple providers and settings, in contrast with ordinary fee-for-service, which pays
each provider separately for each service that is provided.
The BPCI initiative is designed to show whether bundled

payments will improve quality and reduce costs.
Bundled payments have been proposed by policy makers for
over a decade as one approach to reforming the healthcare
payment system[1–3] to address escalating costs and suboptimal quality. As the largest insurer of health care in the US,
Medicare has taken a keen interest in the potential of bundles to give providers new incentives that align with Medicare’s objective of ensuring access to high quality and costefficient care.
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This paper provides the first window into the possible effects
of the BPCI initiative by providing information about the
characteristics of hospitals participating in one of the bundle programs and the number of bundles covered by their
applications.
1.1

How bundled payments for care improvement
works

Medicare’s BPCI initiative was launched by the Center for
Medicare and Medicaid Innovation (CMMI) in 2011 with
the first bundles “going live” in April 2013. The innovative reform of BPCI is that the participant, or Awardee, will
be responsible for overall Medicare costs, based on the patient’s DRG, for an episode of care such as an inpatient
hospital stay and/or for certain post-acute care. This total
episode of care cost responsibility provides an incentive for
multiple providers caring for a patient to work together to
provide high quality care that lowers cost and minimizes the
need for subsequent care.
Providers were invited to apply to the voluntary initiative in
the summer of 2011. They were offered a range of options
for participating in the program, with the main variations
pertaining to: (1) the setting and duration of the bundled
payment, and (2) the number and type of conditions, defined by the DRG, included in the bundled payment. All
bundles begin with the index event of an acute-care hospitalization. Four models are currently active, and we study
what is labeled Model 2.
Model 2 covers services during periods of 30, 60, or 90 days
encompassing hospital and post-acute care. The bundled
payment includes all Medicare Part A and Part B services,
including readmissions, within the Model-specific time period and related to the bundle condition. Participants could
choose the types and numbers of conditions for which they
would receive bundled payments.
An episode of care includes the spectrum of Medicareinsured services provided to patients starting with an initial
inpatient admission. The DRG assigned during this hospitalization is known as the “Anchor DRG”. Clusters of related severity DRGs are aggregated into episodes of care.
For instance, the Congestive Heart Failure bundle includes
all patients hospitalized in DRGs 291, 292, or 293. These
are: heart failure and shock with MCC (major complications
or comorbidities), heart failure and shock with CC (complications or comorbidities), and heart failure and shock without CC/MCC. There are two bundles which represent a single DRG; for example, the bundle for Transient Ischemia
represents patients hospitalized and assigned to DRG 69.
Providers could apply to participate in as few as one and
as many as 48 bundles, representing 179 unique DRGs.
Patients of participating providers can continue to seek care
from any provider. Patients will receive information about
the bundles program and its financial incentives either upon
38
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hospitalization or admission to post-acute care, depending
on the BPCI Model. Providers will continue to collect (and
report to Medicare) the usual clinical, administrative and demographic data for patients covered by a bundle and will
provide additional data specific to the BPCI program.
Similar to DRG, Medicare will contract for a bundle price
for an episode of care, using a baseline price calculated from
three years of historical data. After the baseline price is
calculated, CMS requires a discount rate between 2% and
3.25%, depending on the type and length of episode of care,
and the particular Model. The target price for the bundle is
calculated by trending forward the baseline price to the performance year and subtracting the discount rate. By building a discount into the price or payment for an episode of
care, CMS is guaranteeing savings and expecting participating providers to reduce Medicare spending by at least two
percent.
In Model 2, providers participating in the BPCI initiative
will continue to submit claims to Medicare and be paid
via their traditional payment model — fee-for-service, per
diem, or prospective payment — depending on the type of
provider. Medicare will reconcile the sum of the fee-forservice claims paid to providers during bundled episodes
with the target price of the bundle. Differences will then
be settled, with savings beyond the target price distributed
to participants, and deficits repaid to Medicare.
The BPCI initiative is a phased program for Model 2. Phase
1 consists of a non-binding, no risk period denoted the
“preparation period”. Phase 2 includes financial risk for the
successful BPCI Awardees and began on October 2013 or
January 2014. This analysis examines the hospitals associated with BPCI Model 2 Awardees that entered into the
risk-bearing agreements with CMS starting Phase 2 in October 2013 or January 2014. All BPCI episodes must begin
Phase 2 by January 2015.
1.2

National implications of the BPCI evaluation

The BPCI program may be expanded nationally by Medicare if its evaluation finds that bundled payments are effective in reducing spending without compromising quality, or
in improving quality without increasing spending.
The representativeness of the participants will be critical to
determining the potential scalability of the BPCI program
in Medicare, including how, where and for whom the program should be scaled. Should the program be expanded
for multiple conditions, or just a limited set? Can bundled payments be applied in markets across the country?
Should the program be applied to both high and low quality
providers, those serving as safety net providers, rural and
urban providers? These key questions must be answered by
the BPCI evaluation.
Our analysis of the Model 2 BPCI Phase 2 participants deISSN 1927-6990
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scribes the characteristics of healthcare organizations that
are assuming financial risk in Model 2 of the BPCI initiative and will help identify opportunities for strengthening
the evaluation plan and increasing the potential generalizability of the initiative’s findings.

2

Study data and methods

Our analysis focuses on BPCI Phase 2 episode-initiating
hospitals in Model 2. A similar analysis could be applied
to participants of other Models.
Medicare recently published a list of 107 hospitals participating in Phase 2 of the BPCI Model 2. For each participating hospital, Medicare released the hospital’s name, address, state, and the number of bundles that the hospital was
selecting to include in this initial phase, ranging from one to
a maximum of 48. Using this information, we obtained each
participating hospital’s national provider identifier (NPI) to
facilitate matching with other data sources. (NPIs could not
be located for two hospitals which were dropped from the
analysis.) Our analysis focuses on the 105 hospitals with
an NPI, four of which we could not ascertain the ownership
status.
Episode-initiating hospitals were stratified according to the
number of bundles they were participating in during Phase
2. Hospitals that applied for five or fewer bundles were classified as “narrow”, representing a limited amount of innovation and financial risk. Hospitals applying to participate in
the maximum number of bundles, 48, were classified them
as “comprehensive” as they were proposing to adopt bundled payments for patients in 179 unique DRG. Remaining
hospitals applied for between 6 and 40 bundles, and were
classified as “medium” representing some breadth of clinical conditions and financial risk.
Using these hospitals NPI’s, we made a linkage to the
American Hospital Association (AHA) resource file (2011),
which includes descriptive information on over 6,500 hospitals. Information in the AHA file about non-participating
hospitals provided a point of comparison.
The hospital’s NPIs were also linked to a cross section of
their hospital’s publicly reported performance data from
the 2013 Hospital Value-Based Purchasing (HVBP) program[4] in order to compare hospital’s publicly reported
performance measures to non-participating hospitals. The
HVBP program consists of a clinical process of care domain that assesses hospital’s performance on quality measures in acute myocardial infarction, healthcare-associated
infections (HAIs), heart failure, pneumonia, and surgical
care improvement; and a patient experience of care domain
with measures from the Hospital Consumer Assessment of
Healthcare Providers and Systems Survey (HCAHPS).
With these data, we compared hospital’s performance
on each measure to national benchmarks to generate an
achievement score that ranged between 0 and 10, where
Published by Sciedu Press
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higher scores are better. Prior performance was used to generate an improvement score between 0 and 10. The hospital’s score for each individual measure is the greater of the
achievement or improvement scores, and each domain score
is the sum of those individual scores divided by the total
score of the measures for which the hospital was eligible.
The patient experience of care domain also includes a “consistency score” that assesses whether the hospital performs
well on all HCAHPS measures, or only a subset.
The total performance score is composed of 70% clinical
process of care domain and 30% patient experience of care
domain. Data were not available on some measures for
some hospitals, and these hospitals were omitted from the
comparison. Higher scores are associated with higher performance in the domain, and quality scores are weighted by
the number of domains for which data is reported. Quality
scores of BPCI participants were then compared with scores
of non-participant hospitals.

3

Results

The 105 hospitals that could be linked to our other data
sources are predominantly large, urban hospitals; over twothirds are teaching hospitals (see Table 1). Comparison hospitals not currently participating in the risk bearing phase of
Model 2 tended to have fewer beds, fewer staff, less revenue,
and more Medicare revenue as a share of total revenue. The
hospitals participating in the BPCI Model 2 are predominantly not-for-profit (n = 88), or 87% of hospitals whose
ownership could be established. Bundle-participating hospitals are quite similar to the general hospital population
in disproportionate share, Medicare, Medicaid percentages.
Most participants selected a narrow breadth of bundles (n =
82), with a smaller number selecting a medium breadth of
bundles (n = 22), and only one Awardee selecting the comprehensive package of bundles.
3.1

Hospital quality

There were only minor differences in quality scores between
hospitals participating in the BPCI Model 2, and those not
participating (see Table 2). For pneumonia, HAIs and heart
failure, the quality scores were nearly identical. Hospitals
in the BPCI Model 2 performed slightly better on the surgical care domain; however, performed more poorly than
non-participants on acute myocardial infarction, patient experience and total performance scores.
3.2

Focus on the narrow

Fifty four of the 105 Model 2 participants selected a single bundle (see Figure 1). Thirty seven of these participated
with the Clinical Episode of Major Joint Replacement of the
Lower Extremity, and seven selected congestive heart failure. There were only one or two participants for the other
bundles selected as the only condition.
39
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Table 1: Characteristics of hospitals participating in BPCI Model 2
Category of Number of Bundles for Participants, Mean Values Shown
Narrow (≤ 5)

Medium (6-40)

Comprehensive (48)

All Bundle
Participants

Number of Hospitals (%)

82 (78%)

22 (21%)

1 (1%)

105

3197

Total Beds

378

289

342

359

129

FTE on Payroll

2749

1521

1396

2483

755

Hospital Admissions (000s)

182

234

202

193

90

Total Revenues (000,000)

518

312

306

474

135

Urban Hospital (%)

93%

100%

100%

94%

63%

Teaching Hospital

70%

81%

0%

72%

19%

Inpatient Days Medicare (%)

38%

34%

23%

37%

48%

Inpatient Days Medicaid (%)

13%

14%

21%

13%

11%

Disproportionate Share (%)

29%

35%

51%

30%

28%

Hospital Characteristic

Non-Bundle
Participants

Table 2: Comparison of quality scores between hospitals participating in BPCI Model 2 and non-participants
Quality Measures
Pneumonia

Hospital Value-Base Purchasing Program Quality Score
Bundle Participants (N)

Non-Bundle Participants (N)

0.58 (102)

0.57 (2,734)

Hospital Acquired Infection

0.59 (103)

0.59 (2,825)

Acute Myocardial Infarction

0.57 (77)

0.60 (1,308)

Heart Failure

0.57 (103)

0.56 (2,721)

Surgical Care

0.69 (103)

0.67 (2,879)

Patient Experience of Care Score

0.26 (103)

0.33 (2,881)

Total Performance Score

0.52 (103)

0.54 (2,885)

Figure 1: Distribution of hospitals applying for a single
bundle among DRG

4

Discussion

One hundred and seven hospitals have thus far signed riskbearing agreements with CMS in Model 2 of the BPCI initiative. When one considers that Awardees are agreeing to at
least a 2% reduction in episode of care payment in addition
40

to assuming financial risk for the totality of care, this number of participating hospitals plus their post-acute partners is
a moderately encouraging demonstration of support for payment reform. Not surprisingly, BPCI participating hospitals
are larger, urban and more academic, similar to the prior
CMS pilot of the Premier Hospital Demonstration Project[5]
which became the basis for the Hospital Value-Based Purchasing Program. These types of institutions with more resources and regional influence are likely more able to establish the programs and partnerships necessary for success.
The participants are broadly representative of hospitals nationally in terms of disproportionate share, Medicare, Medicaid percentages. Importantly, no significant quality performance differences exist between BPCI Model 2 participants and non-participants, suggesting that participants do
not appear to be self-selecting from the strata of high performing hospitals. This feature makes it more likely that
findings from the BPCI can be generalized in terms of hospitals’ quality measures performance.
The wide latitude afforded to participants in allowing them
to select the number and types of conditions in which they
bundle payments may ultimately provide important insights
into the strategic planning of individual hospitals. With the
ISSN 1927-6990
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majority of Awardees selecting a limited number of bundle conditions, it may be that hospitals are only willing to
risk a limited financial exposure. Alternatively, and possibly simultaneously, those hospitals may be specialty hospitals providing care for a limited number of conditions, and
with the specific expertise and standardization to excel in
that narrow band of services. The 20% of Awardees selecting greater numbers of conditions for bundled payment warrants further investigation since their broader participation
indicates that they are confident in their ability to limit financial risk and decrease Medicare’s spending by more than
2% across a wider range of their admitted patients.
4.1

Informing the decision to scale

The primary goal of the BPCI program, and all CMMI pilots, is to provide Medicare with the information necessary
to decide whether or not to scale a program nationally. Beyond the essential scaling questions of quality and cost established in the ACA, CMS will need to ask two key questions about the pilots: 1) are the characteristics of the participants so different that their experiences provide little basis
for generalizing? and 2) does the pilot have the statistical
power to reliably answer the scaling questions? While the
BPCI program is just out of the starting gate, the characteristics of participants and their selection of bundles provides
valuable insights to guide CMS in gathering the necessary
information to answer these questions.
Many of the key features are quite similar between BPCI
participants and non-participants, such as disproportionate
share, Medicare, Medicaid percentages and, importantly,
quality measure performance. The quality analysis determining that the participating hospitals are not the “cream”
provides comfort regarding the generalizability. The most
striking difference is that bundle participants are larger than
most hospitals across the country, with 88% of BPCI hospitals having greater than 150 beds, while 28% of the complement of AHA hospitals have greater than 150 beds.
This finding does not necessarily mean that the results will
not be applicable and may simply reflect the greater flexibility of larger hospitals to participate in pilot programs.
However, it does suggest that CMS will need to closely
examine the performance of those smaller, rural and nonacademic hospitals to determine whether those subgroups
achieve similar outcomes to the typical bundle participants.
Additionally, the evaluation will need to consider the context in which the program did or did not work so that CMS
can understand in what conditions and for what kinds of
providers the program can be scaled.
The BPCI evaluation will also need to carefully consider
whether they have sufficient numbers of participants in particular conditions to provide the statistical power necessary
for reliable conclusions on spending or quality indicators.
For DRG where the number of participating hospitals is
Published by Sciedu Press
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smaller, such as stroke, the results may cause a number
of confounded and inconclusive findings: the difference in
spending or quality is large but the confidence in the findings is low, or there is no effect. Small numbers of bundle
applicants may also undermine efforts to develop a risk adjustment mechanism for future bundled payment initiatives.
For a number of other DRG clusters in which the number of
hospitals is larger, the effects are likely to be more definitive. As an example, the larger number of Awardees with
the lower extremity joint replacement bundle may allow the
statistical power to detect smaller effect sizes. It will be important to be cognizant of the need for statistical power during the evaluation, given the large number of DRG options
available in the BPCI program and the potential combinations of those DRGs.
4.2

Limitations

This analysis focused on hospitals and the findings underrepresent the interest and motivation of post-acute care
providers participating in bundled payments. Since specific information about the contracts established between
providers participating in the program are not publicly available, we are unable to comment on the nature of the partnerships between hospitals, physicians, post-acute, ambulatory,
or other care providers. In assessing the representativeness
of hospitals to hospitals across the country, the similarity
on quality measure performance is reassuring but may miss
other non-measured sources of volunteer bias. This analysis
of Phase 2 participants is the first snapshot of Awardees, and
providers currently in Phase 1 may advance to Phase 2 in the
future which could change the characteristic composition of
Awardees.

5

Conclusions

Innovations to the way Medicare pays for services and how
providers organize delivery are urgently needed. It is encouraging to see CMS tackle fragmentation and ineffective
use with pragmatic payment reforms. Bundled payments
provide one possible vehicle to align incentives in order to
support simultaneously achieving quality and cost control
goals. As with any pilot, the evaluation is the key element.
In the case of the BPCI, the health care for millions of Americans and the ability to pay for that care rests on the decision
about whether or not the program should be scaled. The
BPCI is now underway and, as the evaluation unfolds over
the next year, this preliminary analysis of who is participating in the pilot provides important guidance to developing
an analysis that is both nationally applicable and scientifically valid in making the all-important scaling decision.
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